ILN IP Insider - International Lawyers Network

Is There Liability for Removing or Altering Copyright Management Information from a Copyrighted Work?

By Daniel H. Bliss

Suppose you have uncovered a copyrighted work from another that contains copyright management information such as a copyright notice. However, you want to remove or alter this copyright management information. Should you remove or alter any copyright management information from the copyrighted work? The answer is NO because there is liability!

What is copyright management information (“CMI”)? CMI is defined under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c) as information, including in digital form, …: “(1) The title and other information identifying the work, including the information set forth on a notice of copyright. (2) The name of, and other identifying information about, the author of a work. (3) The name of, and other identifying information about, the copyright owner of the work, including the information set forth in a notice of copyright … (6) Terms and conditions for use of the work. (7) Identifying numbers or symbols referring to such information or links to such information …” conveyed in connection with copies, phonorecords, performances, or displays of a copyrighted work.

Is there an independent cause of action for removing or altering CMI such as a copyright notice from the copyrighted work? Under 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b), “[n]o person shall, without the authority of the copyright owner or the law (1) intentionally remove or alter any copyright management information, (2) distribute or import for distribution copyright management information knowing that the copyright management information has been removed or altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law, or (3) distribute, import for distribution, or publicly perform works, copies of works, or phonorecords, knowing that copyright management information has been removed or altered without authority of the copyright owner or the law knowing, or … having reasonable grounds to know, that it will induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal an infringement of any right …”.

Does this cause of action apply to anyone without exception? Under Section 1202, there is no cause or action or liability for authorized investigative, protective, information security, or intelligence activities of certain law enforcement, intelligence, or government agencies. What are the civil remedies for violation of these provisions? Under 17 U.S.C. § 1203, a plaintiff may recover statutory damages for each violation “in the sum of not less than $2,500 or more than $25,000,” with the exact amount being determined by the court, as well as attorneys’ fees and injunctive relief. Thus, Section 1202 will only apply to a person or entity that knowingly or should have known that the CMI has been removed or altered on the copyrighted work and distributes the copyrighted work.

Let’s assume that your copyrighted work is a photograph. Suppose you have placed your name directly on the photograph, in the photo metadata, or in a watermark when it is published. Further, suppose someone posts that photograph on their website without your name on it. Is there liability? In the case of Murphy v. Millennium Radio Group LLC, 650 F.3d 295 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit Court held that defendants were liable for both unauthorized use of plaintiff’s photograph and removal of CMI from the photograph. In Murphy, a photographer who took photographs and placed a gutter credit with his name on the photographs, when published. However, a radio station copied the photographs and posted them to the web without the gutter credit. Murphy filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement and violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for removing the gutter credit. The court found that “a cause of action under §1202 of the DMCA potentially lies whenever the types of information listed in § 1202(c)(1)-(8) and ‘conveyed in connection with copies…of a work…including in digital form’ is falsified or removed, regardless of the form in which that information is conveyed.”

Based upon the above, you should never remove or alter copyright management information or CMI from a copyrighted work. There is liability for removing or altering CMI from a copyrighted work. Unlike statutory damages for copyright infringement, damages for liability under Section 1202 do not require that the copyright owner register the copyrighted work before the infringement occurs. Therefore, it is recommended that you add CMI to all of your copyrighted works. It will provide an independent cause of action, and you may prevail in a copyright infringement suit for either or both copyright infringement or CMI removal. In addition, a court may award statutory damages and attorneys’ fees if it concludes that someone knowingly removed CMI and distributed the copyrighted work.

Infringement of Trademark by Metatag and Keywords

By Abhijeet Das, Partner, Pragya Jain, Associate and Ashish Kumar, Associate, LexCounsel Law Offices

Introduction

Post-pandemic, there has been a significant rise in digital marketing worldwide. Companies are utilising platforms (“Platforms”) like Google Ads and various social media networks to connect with prospective customers. To showcase their products or services on these Platforms, businesses often use keywords or metatags to attract users searching for similar offerings. However, instances have emerged where companies use the trademarks of other businesses as keywords to advertise their own products or services. Companies are pouring huge amounts of money into ensuring their websites get noticed and as a result, some are adopting tactics like manipulating meta tags, framing, and using deceptive links to attract more visitors. Metatags are HTML elements that provide metadata about a webpage, such as descriptions or keywords, which help search engines categorize and rank pages.

This article examines whether the use of a trademark as a metatag or keyword in India constitutes trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (“Act”). In India, a registered trademark is infringed when a person, who is neither the registered proprietor nor an authorized user, uses the mark in the course of trade without due cause and who does so in a way that either unfairly benefits from or harms the distinctive character or reputation of the trademark in India.¹

Judicial Precedents on Infringement by “Metatags” and “Keywords”

In the case of Google LLC vs. DRS Logistics (P) Limited², the Delhi High Court dealt with the issue of using registered trademarks as keywords in Google’s advertising program. DRS alleged that Google encourages use of registered trademark as keywords for the purpose of advertisement on Google ads. DRS contented that this practice diverted online traffic from the trademark proprietor’s website to the advertiser’s website, which constitutes infringement under the Act. DRS further contended that keywords and metatags serve similar functions, as both can redirect traffic from the trademark owner’s site to that of the advertiser or infringer.

Google argued that using a keyword in its advertising program does not qualify as “use” under the Act, even if the keyword is identical or similar to a registered trademark. Google asserted that any liability for trademark infringement should rest with the advertiser using the keyword. Google is merely an intermediary having safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Additionally, Google differentiated metatags from keywords, explaining that metatags form a part of its website’s source code and influence search engine rankings. Whereas keywords are solely used for ad targeting and are not embedded in the website code. Further, keywords are not visible to users and serve only to facilitate ad shortlisting.

The court noted that the use of trademarks as keywords qualifies as “use” under Sections 2(2) and 29(6) of the Act. It further clarified that liability for infringement would rest with Google and not the advertiser. However, the court emphasized that using a trademark as a keyword does not automatically constitute infringement. Applying the doctrine of Initial Interest Confusion, the court ruled that if a user is initially misled by sponsored links containing the trademark, it amounts to infringement under Section 29(2) of the Act. Additionally, the court observed that metatags and keywords serve a similar purpose of displaying advertisements and attracting traffic and since the use of metatags is considered infringement, the same principle would apply to keywords.

In the case of MakeMyTrip India Private Limited v. Booking.com³, the Single Judge Bench of the Delhi High Court addressed the plaintiff’s request for an injunction to protect its registered trademarks, as the defendant allegedly used MakeMyTrip’s marks as keywords in Google Ads. The Court examined Section 29 of the Act and noted that using a trademark to unfairly capitalize on its reputation amounts to infringement under the Act. The defendant’s use of the keyword “MakeMyTrip” was found to potentially exploit MakeMyTrip’s goodwill. The Court recognized the harm caused to the trademark owner and granted an injunction in favor of MakeMyTrip. Subsequently, Google LLC filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, seeking to overturn the Single Judge’s order restraining Booking.com from using “MakeMyTrip” as a keyword. The Division Bench overruled the Single Judge Bench’s decision and observed that the use of “MakeMyTrip” trademark as a keyword by Booking.com doesn’t constitute infringement under Section 29(8) of the Act. The Division Bench opined that “use of trade marks as keywords by competitors absent any confusion or deceit, did not per se amount to infringing use”. Further the Division Bench also observed that the Section 29(4) of the Act would not be applicable as similar services are offered by both the companies. Thereafter, MakeMyTrip challenged the Division Bench’s ruling, and the case is now sub judice before the Delhi High Court.

Similarly, in Mattel Inc. & Ors. v. Jayant Agarwalla & Ors⁴., the court addressed the issue of search engine indexing and the use of meta-tags, ruling that utilizing trademarks as meta-tags constitutes infringement. In Kapil Wadhwa & Ors. v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd⁵., the Delhi High Court granted an injunction against the defendants for using the plaintiff’s registered marks as meta-tags. This ruling was later upheld by the Division Bench.

Additionally, in People Interactive (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Gaurav Jerry⁶, the Bombay High Court examined the defendant’s unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s registered mark “shaadi.com” as a meta-tag and determined that it amounted to trademark infringement. The Court observed that this use diverted traffic and caused harm to the plaintiff’s registered mark. Moreover, the Court awarded damages to the plaintiff for the losses incurred due to the unauthorized use of the trademark.

Conclusion

In view of the aforesaid judicial precedents, the courts have consistently held that the use of “Keywords” or “Metatags” can lead to trademark infringement under Section 29 of the Act. Courts have clarified that “use” in this context encompasses digital advertising, acknowledging that employing trademarks as keywords can constitute infringement if it causes consumer confusion or unfairly exploits the trademark’s reputation. Cases such as Google LLC vs. DRS Logistics and MakeMyTrip India Pvt. Ltd. v. Booking.com highlight the importance of protecting trademark owner’s rights in the digital era. The application of the doctrine of Initial Interest Confusion helps protect consumers from misleading advertising, although it introduces subjectivity, especially when assessing what constitutes “confusion” in the context of digital marketing.

While in the aforementioned cases, the courts have addressed the issue of trademark infringement in the digital space, the ever-evolving nature of digital advertising necessitates ongoing legal adaptation. As businesses increasingly rely on keywords and metatags for marketing, it is crucial to strike a balance between protecting intellectual property rights and fostering fair competition. Further legal clarity and possible legislative adjustments may be needed to establish clearer boundaries for the use of trademarks in online advertising. In the end, businesses must navigate these complexities carefully to mitigate legal risks and ensure the fair use of trademarks in the digital marketplace.

[1] Section 29(4)(c) of the Trademark Act, 1999

[2] 2023 FAO(OS)(COMM) 2/2022

[3] CS (COMM) 268/2022

[4] 2008 (153) DLT 548

[5] 194 (2012) DLT 23

[6] 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4607

THAT’S NOT TRUE: Thoughts, Novel or Not, On Truth, Context, & Defamation

Defamation cases are hard ones in the real world.

Recent US matters involving Dominion Voting, Sara Palin, and even Cheetos show that these cases continue to interest the general public as well as legal cognoscenti. Resolving these lawsuits is dependent on understanding concepts of truth, accuracy, fact, opinion, and all manner of issues that define the context of the statements at the root of the claims. As one U.S. court noted in upholding the dismissal of a defamation claim, the law “provides redress for injuries to a person’s reputation…caused by statements that ‘tend[] to expose a person to hatred, contempt or aversion, or to induce an evil or unsavory opinion of him in the minds of a substantial number in the community,’” but “a threshold issue for resolution by the court is whether the statement alleged to have caused plaintiff an injury is reasonably susceptible to the defamatory meaning imputed to it.” As the court went to note in that case, Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1997), “[t]he court’s threshold inquiry is guided not only by the meaning of the words as they would be commonly understood but by the words considered in the context of their publication,…as well as ‘from the expressions used as from the whole scope and apparent object of the writer.’” In the end, to succeed, a defamation suit plaintiff “must prove that the defendant published a false, defamatory statement ‘of and concerning’ the plaintiff with a certain degree of fault,” as one source summed it up. To paraphrase my opening above, “[f]amously, defamation cases are hard for plaintiffs to win, and purposefully so,” and this is especially so in the United States.

Defamation cases are even harder in fictional worlds. (I am not talking about suits in the raising claims of defamation of avatars in virtual worlds. While commentators have long sought to justify applying real-life consequences to Second Life settings and its avatars or to protect as important online gaming personas, and more recently have repeated such musing as to virtual reality platforms and other augmented reality forums, these settings seem one step further removed from what should come into our courts.)

I am talking about cases, somewhat frequently filed, where a real person claims that a novel, television show or other fictional work defamed them. Those are hard cases legally and raise all manner of interesting issues as to what “fact” and “truth” mean in many settings. See, e.g., Robert Richards analyzed them in some detail in When Ripped from the Headlines Means See You in Court: Libel by Fiction and the Tort-Law Twist on a Controversial Defamation Concept at 121 (“’[t]he gradation from fact to fiction in creative works—or more likely, from representational fact to fact-infused fiction—raises difficult issues about the balance between private rights and First Amendment interests.” The difficulty of so-called “libel by fiction” cases struck me recently (though not for the first time, albeit there more as a matter of copyright and publicity rather than defamation) when I read that Nona Gaprindashvili recently settled the earlier lawsuit that she had brought against Netflix over The Queen’s Gambit, a fictional streaming series based on a 1983 eponymous novel set in the 1960s chess world.

Nona Gaprindashvili sued Netflix in September 2021 for “false light invasion of privacy” and defamation after a line in the hit series stated that she “never faced men” at the chessboard. In reality and in the novel that was the series’ source material, Gaprindashvili faced male opponents in chess matches during her career, including three world champions (grandmasters Mikhail Tal, Boris Spassky, and Viswanathan Anand), and in fact, the novel on which the series was based had said “[t]here was Nona Gaprindashvili, not up to the level of this tournament, but a player who had met all these Russian Grandmasters many times before,’” as a commentator noted. Gaprindashvili had leverage to settle that case because a California federal district court had ruled in 2022 that “[a]s an initial matter, Netflix does not cite, and the Court is not aware, of any cases precluding defamation claims for the portrayal of real persons in otherwise fictional works. On the contrary, the fact that the Series was a fictional work does not insulate Netflix from liability for defamation if all the elements of defamation are otherwise present.”

It does not seem to me that all of the elements of defamation are ever so present in an avowedly fictional work. I understand that the Gaprindashvili, and that California court (at 11-14) in its opinion, obviously disagrees with my conclusion. I am going to talk it through anyway.

Before jumping back into discussing that case directly, it is important to discuss defamation law a bit and to discuss the concepts of “fact” and “truth” that create the context in which one must assess how defamation and the novel evolved together. The “civil tort of defamation provides a legal forum where truth can be separated from fiction,” as Sean Latham wrote in The Art of Scandal: Modernism, Libel Law, and the Roman a Clef (Modernist Literature and Culture), 1969 (Kindle Version), at Location 1218. That plays directly into the “basic generic distinction between history and fiction”:

The former…”is a narrative discourse with different rules than those that govern fiction. The producer of a historical text affirms that the events entextualized did indeed occur prior to entextualization. … We thus recognize historical narrative primarily by a shared assumption that it is always a secondary description of events that preceded its narration. …Fiction, however, is “certainly otherwise, for in fiction the events may be said to be created by and with the text. They have no prior temporal existence, even though they are presented as if they did.

[Latham, supra, at Location 239]

Defamation law’s distinction between fact and fiction thus played a role in the rise of the novel:

libel laws played a vital institutionalizing role in the novel’s rise during the eighteenth century, effectively creating a set of legal definitions designed to separate political discourse from fictional invention.

***

This legal distinction between fact and fiction created the consensus upon which the growing autonomy of the nineteenth-century aesthetic sphere was staked, consequently forcing, as Davis concludes, “writers who wished to write about the world away from such overtly political modes as the one offered by the newspaper and toward a more protected form of writing” such as the novel.

[Latham, supra, at Locations 1219, 1223]

Interestingly, in light of the whole libel by fiction category, the novel originally evolved in part as a fictional genre thought to “afford[] authors a vital degree of legal protection,” Latham, supra, at 1247. The Gaprindashvili decision expressed a contrary approach.

The title of this piece purposely plays on that fact/fiction border and the idea that “truth” is a defense to, and untruth a requirement for, defamation. Viscerally, the very idea that the statement at issue here—that Gaprindashvili “never faced men”—was untrue would seemingly establish the first element of a defamation claim, namely that the statement was an untrue assertion of fact. While the statement is untrue, so is everything else in The Queen’s Gambit in a very real sense. It is a work of fiction, and for a defamation action “to be viable, it must be based on an assertion as fact material which is false or the implication of an assertion of fact which is false,” as noted in Winter v. DC Comics, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 438 (2d App. Dist., 4th Div. 2002)(citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 US 1, 18 (1990), and affirming dismissal of defamation claims related to comic book depictions). Thus, while untrue, it is hard to imagine that the contents of a novel would ever be seen as “an assertion of fact.” Richards, at 133 (“works of fiction, regardless of their resemblance to reality, are, at core, not real.”); O’Neil, Fiction, Defamation, and Freedom of Speech, at 866 (“Even when they do put real people in their stories and depict them as doing bad things, the audience is still usually meant only to imagine the real people doing bad things.”) (emphasis in original), and 871 (“the content of fiction is paradigmatically invented or made up”). So the cry that “that’s not true” is far from a damning admission establishing an element of the claim; rather, it is an observation establishing that that phrase means something very different than the words convey no truth–the screenwriter’s goal here was not what’s true as a factual assertion, but what expresses, though fictional, an artistic truth.

That was the “whole scope and apparent object of the writer” of this line in the series, and courts should perhaps recognize that works of fiction are “not produced in a way that is reflective of the world as it actually is,” as Sara Worth notes (with her own emphasis), and as I noted recently as to rap music.

Therein lies the rub. In courts, truth and fact are oft’ viewed as synonymous concepts. While Flannery O’Connor’s notes that “the basis of art is truth, both in matter and in mode” and

Keats’ that “Beauty is truth, truth beauty./That is all ye know on earth and all ye need to know,” “fact” and “truth” are not synonyms in the creative world. This dichotomy is well exemplified in Melville’s line in Moby Dick that “Queequeg was a native of Rokovoko, an island far away to the West and South. It is not down in any map; true places never are,” as I have mentioned in the past.

Artists are much more concerned with such “truths” than with particular accuracy as to the “facts,” and admit to their disjuncture:

Maybe art does not capture the truth, by which I mean some form of ongoing, lasting, unchanging truth. That seemed clear with respect to the changeability of human perception. Perhaps our answer is this: Art is just a momentary glance. And in this nanosecond of capture, we get some sort of momentary reality. I think Dutch still life paintings are much like this because we are aware that the food will rot, the dog, the monkey and the parrot will leave, and so forth.

***

But perhaps there is another route. Even if we paint the world as we see it, we may accept that others see it somewhat differently. Even so, we may suggest that there is still something important that is shared in the art. Considering Monet’s cathedral we get a feeling of the day, of the light he captured from his apartment window as he looked across the square to the building. I have pointed out what I think is the Platonic view versus the Aristotelian view of the world. On one hand Plato said an artist was “an imitator of images and is very far removed from the truth” (Republic X, 27). On the other hand, Aristotle said, “The aim of art is not to represent the outward appearance of things, but their inward significance.” (Attributed to Aristotle by Seneca in On Tranquility of Mind).

I think that often art does function metaphorically, and we realize some truth through it.

[Christopher Willard, Art: The Lie That Tells The Truth, Medium, September 24, 2019 (emphasis in original)]

In the Queen’s Gambit screenplay, having a chess talent like Gaprindashvili excluded in that fictional world from competing with men spoke to the writer’s non-factualized truth and the subjective truth of that art for others. As “Pablo Picasso stated in a letter of 1923 to Marius de Zayas, ‘We all know that Art is not truth. Art is a lie that makes us realize truth.’” To make the artistic point, the series bent the actual truth, and maybe Gaprindashvili in that sense was not defending her real honor in the California suit but the honor of some identically named avatar in a fictional world of another’s creation. It seems unnecessary to support such defamation actions, as noted above.

Of course, there are countervailing considerations with letting fiction writers totally off the hook for getting the “facts” right. In many ways, the Gaprindashvili case was an easy, focused one, dealing with a passing reference to a real person and a single factual difference between that person’s real and fictitious history. There was no doubt, therefore, that the statement was one that on its surface seemed unassailably to be “of or concerning” Gaprindashvili. In other contexts, though, even such basic and directed facts may not establish a defamation claim. We see this, as one commentator notes (at 880-81), in the case brought against the movie American Hustle, where a fictional character’s untrue statement about a specific real person was held non-defamatory because “the audience ‘would not expect anything [that character] says to reflect objective fact.”

The more troublesome cases come from works that (arguably) track much more of a subject’s real life, then deviate, perhaps with a name change or biographical detail, to create a widely different series of defamatory acts attributed by the reader or viewer to the model for the character as well as the character. Such so-called “libel by fiction” cases have existed for some time, and have been analyzed by many including Robert Richards in When Ripped from the Headlines Means See You in Court: Libel by Fiction and the Tort-Law Twist on a Controversial Defamation Concept, Matthew Savare in Falsity, Fault and Fiction: A New Standard for Defamation in Fiction, and more recently by Collin O’Neil in Fiction, Defamation, and Freedom of Speech. So while I remain in the camp to which “the concept of defamation in fiction seems counterintuitive,” as Savare recognizes (at 131), I see the need to continue the discussion.

One may believe that the authors who want to create fiction should go all in, and not use the crutch of patterning a character after a real person. As the court noted in Carter-Clark v. Random House, a defamation case arising out of the publication of Primary Colors, “[f]or a depiction of a fictional character to constitute actionable defamation, ‘the description of the fictional character must be so closely akin to the real person claiming to be defamed that a reader of the book, knowing the real person, would have no difficulty linking the two. Superficial similarities are insufficient * * *.’” But, as counsel in one libel case told a jury, this becomes a tempting way to write a story: “One of the easiest ways to make a lie believable is to surround it by truth…[t]he more facts you put around the lie, the more believable it becomes, and that the most effective way to tell a story.” Richards, at 121. Thus, some safeguards appear necessary.

Though, as E. T. Wuddah notes in Defamation Law: A Comparison Of The Law Of Defamation In The Republic Of Ireland And In The United States Of America, 13 FAU Undergraduate Journal 80, 81 (2024), “what constitutes defamation differs over time across different societies…influenced by factors such as religion and culture,” this discussion of more modern US defamation law considerations exists against a backdrop of English and, especially, Irish law and experience. Wuddah, supra, at 84. Focusing on the example of James Joyce’s Ulysses, Latham describes Joyce’s fact-heavy fiction as purposely courting defamation claims:

This use of real names and places, in fact, accounts for some of the peculiar pleasures of Joyce’s text, encouraging readers not only to track references to real people and places in the 1904 Thom’s Directory but to follow the fictional paths of Bloom and Stephen minute by minute and step by step as they make their way through Dublin… Joyce famously declared Ulysses so accurate that “if the city one day suddenly disappeared from the earth, it could be reconstructed out of my book.””

***

Just as Joyce deliberately provoked the encounter between law and literature when writing about both obscenity and copyright, so too did he engage the civil statutes of libel that sought to regulate the novel’s engagement with fact.

[Latham, supra, at Locations 1422-23, 1427]

This was Joyce’s chosen artistic aesthetic it seems, adopting despite (or perhaps because of) the associated risk:

In 1912, however, the “nicely polished looking-glass” Joyce hoped to hold up to his native city finally proved too accurate in its fidelity, its intricate details rendering suddenly hazy the increasingly unstable bar between fact and fiction…Roberts and Maunsel, after all, were correct: by using real names and places of business, the stories did run the very real risk of incurring any number of potentially very damaging lawsuits.

***

[The use of real names and places] has by now come to seem an integral part of a distinctly Joycean aesthetic in which fictional events are deeply and perhaps inextricably embedded in the historical realities of Edwardian Dublin.

[Latham, supra, Locations 1469-71, and 1485]

Lest one miss that point, Latham pounds it home:

Given his own abrupt introduction to defamation law, there can be little doubt that Joyce knew what he was doing when he began to fill Ulysses with a staggering array of very precise information about his native city. Unlike the stories in Dubliners, which mention only a few public houses and a railway company, Ulysses invokes a vast array of names ranging from individuals to businesses to commercial products.

***

Throughout Ulysses, Joyce deliberately and provocatively invokes this genre to probe the boundary between fact and fiction, thereby pitting legal and aesthetic modes of interpretation against one another in a scandalous yet creative conflict.

***

Rather than concealing its engagement with historical reality as Victorian novelists typically did by decorously avoiding the names of real people, Joyce uses the roman a clef to destabilize the autonomy of art and the increasingly fraught legal institutions designed to maintain a critical distance between fiction and fact.

***

In Ulysses, therefore, Joyce created a work that is blatantly libelous yet seeks to elude that charge in its misdirected names, its aesthetic difficulty, and its deconstructive ironies.

[Latham, supra, Locations 1510, 1574, 1606]

While the obscenity challenges faced, for example, by James Joyce’s Ulysses have greater notoriety, see Latham, supra, at Location 1609, Latham observes that defamation law was the field in which one saw the “turbulent encounter between literature and the law” because “the tort of defamation-by legally separating fact from fiction-provides the framework through which a particular piece of writing is presumed to be pure invention and thus without financial, legal, and moral consequence for living individuals. Despite the fact that libel thus essentially constitutes the law of fiction, however, its importance in shaping modern literary production has been almost entirely ignored.” Latham, supra, at Locations 1146 and 1228-30.

Indeed, it’s been said that the “Irish public [ha]s [a] ceaseless fascination with defamation actions.” (In fact, Ireland is presently considering an overhaul of its defamation law). In older governmental reports, the Irish had examined, in the defamation context, “the peculiar considerations which governed two particular types of factual statements, the first being the fictional …,” and even considered a “proposal that there should be a complete ban on defamation proceedings in respect of fictional works, unless the plaintiff could point to special circumstances which would cause the recipient to suspend his or her belief that the work was fictitious.” That proposal was rejected in favor of a different remedy, namely one that the Irish defamation report described by noting that “the problem in relation to works of fiction might be more appropriately met by imposing a more stringent test of identification where defamatory matter appeared in a fictional context.” Consequently, the Irish “invited views as to whether, in cases involving defamatory matter contained in a fictional context, the ordinary requirement of identification should be supplemented by a requirement that the matter be reasonably understood as referring to ‘actual qualities or events involving the plaintiff.’”

This Irish suggestion makes sense to me. It seems “to strike a balance between two of the rights in the Irish Constitution: freedom of expression and the right to a good name,” as Wuddah notes (at 83, citing Irish Constitution, Art. 40.6.1 for freedom of expression and Article 40.3.2 on requirement that Irish government “shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every citizen.” (emphasis added) Though the US Constitution does not have that latter express protection, there is a recognition here that one is entitled to protect his or her reputation.

While I can accept the need to protect real people from being defamed in fictional works circulated in the real world, I agree with the Irish suggestion, Richards and others that plaintiffs in libel by fiction cases need to meet a higher standard “to protect the integrity of the creative process,” Richards, at 134, and to avoid any approach that would “have the unintended effect of reinstituting strict liability for defamation of works of fiction,” as once seen in the United Kingdom and the United States. Berna Warner-Fredman, Defamation In Fiction: With Malice Toward None and Punitive Damages for All, 16 Loyola Of Los Angeles Law Review 99, 101 (1983)(citing Hulton & Co. v. Jones, 101 L.T.R. 831 (1909), and Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 126 N.E. 260 (NY 1920)) Richards presents an interesting and useful test (at 135-36) that he calls the innocent construction test. He begins by noting that “[c]reators of works of fiction are entitled to a presumption that their works are indeed fictitious, including the characters portrayed therein.” If a defamation plaintiff sues based on a fictional character, that plaintiff should lose if that “if the character …is capable of being viewed as actually portraying someone other than the plaintiff.” Indeed, “the defense is entitled to that construction as a matter of law” because “[t]o hold otherwise threatens the common creative and literary technique of authors and producers to imbue their characters with realistic qualities.” As Richards goes on to note that “[a]dopting the innocent construction rule in libel-by-fiction cases by having it apply to the ‘of and concerning’ element would effectively reduce such lawsuits except in the most egregious instances.”

So, my title was probably not particularly accurate—one need not decry the novel as not true, but only as not fact (or, as I noted in quoting Bettelhein in that earlier piece alluded to above, “although these stories are unreal, they are not untrue.”). And that is nothing like saying it is necessarily defamatory because it is not a statement of fact. The Richards’ test (or Irish approach if you prefer) seems to leave authors the expressive freedom necessary to seek artistic truth without being limited to actual fact. So, in closing, I will note that many have made observations on fiction writing that are akin to Picasso’s quote stated above where he connected us to the role that art can play in revealing truth: “Writing fiction is the act of weaving a series of lies to arrive at a greater truth,” as novelist Khaled Hosseini aptly stated. I wrote once that “[s]o we too have joined that discussion, which will continue beyond this post and piece.” Having rejoined and moved forward that discussion, at least somewhat I hope, we will leave it here for now. We do so because “[t]he truth is rarely pure and never simple. Modern life would be very tedious if it were either, and modern literature a complete impossibility!,” as the Irish playwright wrote in the first act of The Importance of Being Earnest, A Trivial Comedy for Serious People.

PERSONALITY RIGHTS – THE POWER OF INFLUENCE, ITS MISUSE AND PROTECTION

INTRODUCTION

Publicity rights play an important role in India based on the culture of celebrity worship and the importance of the name, image, and likeness of sports, television and media personalities, political figures, musicians, etc. Indian intellectual property laws do not directly or explicitly recognize personality rights, but several regulations and provisions address the same. In India, the right to publicity is recognised as a part of the right to privacy. In the case of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India[1], where the right to privacy was declared a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court also reflected upon personality rights and observed that:

Every individual should have a right to be able to exercise control over his/her own life and image as portrayed to the world and to control the commercial use of his/her identity. This also means that an individual may be permitted to prevent others from using his image, name, and other aspects of his/her personal life and identity for commercial purposes without his/her consent.

On the other hand, the field of intellectual property provides indirect protection of publicity rights under the Copyright Act, 1957 (“Copyright Act”) and the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (“Trade Marks Act”). Under Section 38 of the Copyright Act, the provision grants two kinds of rights to a performer which are exclusive rights to the performer under Section 38A and moral rights to the performer under Section 38B. On the other hand, the Trade Marks Act, in its section 2(m) includes ‘names’ under the definition of ‘trademark’, which allows celebrities to register their names as trademarks to avoid misuse. There have been numerous celebrities in India, like Shah Rukh Khan, Priyanka Chopra, Ajay Devgn, and Amitabh Bachchan, on account of their goodwill and reputation, who are registered proprietors of their respective names.

THE JUDICIARY ON PERSONALITY RIGHTS

The concept of ‘personality rights’, although lacking a robust statutory framework in India, has emerged through a series of judicial interpretations to acquire a nuanced significance in the contemporary legal discourse. The stance taken by the Courts of India has been primarily to bridge the gap and maintain a balance between the right to freedom of expression and personality rights, especially in a digital world where Artificial Intelligence proficiently integrates into our daily lives. On the lines of the set premise, some of the recent developments are discussed below –

In the case of Jaikishan Kakubhai Saraf v. Peppy Store[2], the High Court of Delhi refused to grant an ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff to uphold the artistic and economic expression of the defendant. The defendants had made a compilation video on YouTube showcasing the plaintiff’s (Jackie Shroff) forthrightness and wit, which the court held to be the existing public perception of the celebrity plaintiff. However, in instances where the plaintiff’s videos were overlayed on audio containing extremely profane words and abuses, the court granted relief in favour of the plaintiff stating that it held the capacity to tarnish the reputation of the plaintiff. Similarly, acts such as hosting AI chatbots where users could ‘chat’ with the chatbot which imitated the plaintiff or selling wallpapers of the plaintiffs without his permission, were prima facie held to be violative of the personality rights of the celebrity.

Similarly, in Manchu Vishnu Vardhan Babu Alias Vishnu Manchu v. Arebumdum & Ors.[3], the Delhi High Court highlighted how a celebrity through their work acquires a unique distinctiveness. This in turn adds immense commercial value to their characteristic attributes due to their inimitable nature. Thus, a third party using such elements of one’s personality is bound to cause confusion and deception amongst the public as to their affiliation with/sponsorship by the celebrity concerned. In the present case, the renowned celebrity plaintiff’s personality and its various aspects were misused by the defendants in multiple ways which maligned his character and were highly prejudicial to the plaintiff’s goodwill and reputation. While the case remains pending for further hearing, it has passed an order restraining the defendants from creating/publishing/communicating to the public/disseminating any content, that defames the plaintiff and from using, exploiting, or misappropriating the personality rights of the plaintiff by using his attributes.

Further, in Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India & Ors.[4], the famous actor plaintiff approached the High Court of Delhi to protect his personality attributes, under various laws and provisions in the absence of a single statutory provision governing his personality and publicity rights. The case at hand illustrated the complex interplay between fame and the rights of individuals, particularly regarding reputation, privacy, and livelihood. While the freedom of speech and the right to information allow for genuine critique and satire concerning public figures, it is believed that this right has its limits. Referring to the landmark case of R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu[5], it summarised the stance of the Supreme Court by recognising that –

The right to privacy is inherently linked to the right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. It safeguards personal and familial matters from unauthorized publication, irrespective of whether the content is positive or negative.
An exception exists for matters of public record, which can be commented upon; however, sensitive issues, particularly those involving victims of crimes, should be handled with discretion.
The proliferation of technology, including artificial intelligence, has facilitated unauthorized representations of a celebrity’s persona, necessitating vigilant protection of their rights.

The Court further highlighted the distinction between freedom of speech in various forms as long as it is genuine and without hurtful intent. It also threw light on the protection of well-known persons who have acquired respectable reputations on which a majority of their livelihood exists. Consequently, the Plaintiff successfully established a prima facie case by warranting the issuance of an ex parte injunction against the defendants.

Further, as regards the aspect of inheritance of publicity rights of a deceased person, in the case of Deepa Jayakumar v. A.L. Vijay[6], the Madras High Court held that

it is clear that a privacy or reputation earned by a person during his or her life time, extinguishes with his or her death. After the death of a person, the reputation earned cannot be inherited like a movable or immovable property by his or her legal heirs. Such personality right, reputation or privacy enjoyed by a person during his life time comes to an end after his or her life time. Therefore, we are of the opinion that “posthumous right” is not an “alienable right.

CONCLUSION

To summarise, the evolving discourse on personality rights in India highlights the delicate balance between individual privacy and freedom of expression in a rapidly changing digital landscape. As celebrities increasingly become targets for exploitation, the need for legal frameworks that protect their unique attributes is paramount. The judicial interpretations in cases such as Jaikishan Kakubhai Saraf v. Peppy Store and Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India underscore the courts’ commitment to safeguarding personality rights while acknowledging the complexities of artistic expression and public discourse.

Moreover, the interplay between intellectual property rights and the constitutional right to privacy provides a foundation for further development in this area. The recognition of personality rights, while still in its nascent stages, holds promise for curbing unauthorized commercial use and protecting the dignity of individuals in the public eye. As technology continues to blur the lines of personal identity, legal protections must evolve to address these challenges effectively. Ultimately, ensuring the integrity of personality rights is essential not only for the welfare of celebrities but also for maintaining ethical standards in a society that is increasingly influenced by public figures.

[1] (2017) 10 SCC 1, 629.

[2] 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3664.

[3] CS(COMM) 828/2024.

[4] CS(COMM) 652/2023.

[5] (1994) 6 SCC 632.

[6] 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2642.

Can Design Patents Be Invalidated?

Suppose you have a design for an ornamental appearance of an article and start producing the article. Subsequently, you receive notice from an owner of a design patent that you are infringing their patent. You conduct a prior art search and find some references related to the design. Can you invalidate the design patent through an inter-parties review in the United States Patent and Trademark Office or a court proceeding based on these prior art references? The answer is YES if the prior art references either anticipate or render obvious the claimed design of the design patent.

For a design patent, 35 U.S.C. § 171 refers, not to the design of an article, but to the design for an article, and is inclusive of ornamental designs of all kinds including surface ornamentation as well as configuration of goods.” In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 204 U.S.P.Q. 988 (C.C.P.A. 1980). The subject matter that is claimed is the design embodied in or applied to an article of manufacture (or portion thereof) and not the article itself. Ex parte Cady, 1916 C.D. 62, 232 O.G. 621 (Comm’r Pat. 1916).

To anticipate a claimed design of a design patent with a single prior art reference under 35 U.S.C. § 102, the ordinary observer test set forth in Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871) is applied, which provides that “if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.” Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528. See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 672 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (making the “ordinary observer” test in Gorham the sole test for determining design patent infringement).

What if the single prior art reference does not anticipate the claimed design because of differences between the designs in the single prior art reference and the design patent? Can you invalidate the design patent because the prior art references render the claimed design obvious? If so, how does one go about proving obviousness for a design patent?

In a recent case, LKQ Corporation v. GM Global Technology Operations LLC, No. 2021-2348, (Fed. Cir. May 21, 2024), GM Global Technology LLC (“GM”) asserted U.S. Design Patent No. D797,625 (‘625 patent), which claimed an ornamental design for a vehicle front fender, against LKQ Corporation and Keystone Automotive Industries, Inc. (collectively “LKQ”). LKQ filed a petition to institute an inter-parties review of the ‘625 patent with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 based on U.S. Design Patent No. D773,340 (“Lian”) and for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on Lian and a promotion brochure to Hyundai that showed the design of a vehicle front fender. Under the ordinary observer test for anticipation, the USPTO found differences between the designs such that there was no anticipation. Under the long-standing Rosen-Durling test for obviousness, which is a two-part test, the USPTO found that LKQ failed to identify a Rosen reference, which is a single reference that has the design characteristics that are the same as the claimed design. Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., Inc., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388, 391 (CCPA 1982)). LKQ Corporation at 7. LKQ appealed and a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affirmed.

Subsequently, the CAFC, en banc, considered the issue of whether the Rosen-Durling test should be used to determine the obviousness of design patents. The CAFC overruled Rosen and Durling and agreed with their precedent holding that “[i]nvalidity based on obviousness of a patented design is determined [based] on factual criteria similar to those that have been developed as analytical tools for reviewing the validity of a utility patent under § 103, that is, on application of the Graham factors.” Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997). LKQ Corporation at 19.

In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966), the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103 and determined the Graham factors as three factual inquiries that include “the scope and content of the prior art”; “differences between the prior art and the claims at issue”; and “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” Id. Further, the Supreme Court held that secondary considerations, such as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented” and may be relevant as “indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness.” Id. at 17–18.

To evaluate the obviousness or nonobviousness of a claimed design, the Graham factors are applied. The first factual inquiry (“Graham factor one”) is directed to the “scope and content of the prior art” within the knowledge of an ordinary designer in the field of design. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. In applying Graham factor one, a primary reference must be identified. Next, the second factual inquiry (“Graham factor two”) is directed to determining the differences between the prior art designs and the design claim at issue. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. In applying Graham factor two, the visual appearance of the claimed design is compared with prior art designs from the perspective of an ordinary designer in the field of the article of manufacture. See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elects., Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Then, the third factual inquiry (“Graham factor three”) is directed to “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art [must be] resolved.” Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. In applying Graham factor three, “a person of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertains” is assessed from the viewpoint of an ordinary designer in the field to which the claimed design pertains. Based on applying the Graham factors, it is determined whether an ordinary designer in the field to which the claimed design pertains would have been motivated to modify the prior art design “to create the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.” Campbell Soup, Co. v. Gamon Plus, Inc., 10 F.4th 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The CAFC held that the obviousness inquiry for design patents still requires the assessment of secondary considerations as indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness when evidence of such considerations is presented. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18 (“Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.”).

As to practice tips, the next time you receive notice from an owner of a design patent that you are infringing their patent, you should conduct a prior art search and consider invalidating the design patent based on anticipation and obviousness. To invalidate a design patent based on anticipation, you should use the ordinary observer test to evaluate whether the two designs between the prior art reference and the design patent are substantially the same. If there are differences, you should attempt to invalidate the design patent based on obviousness using the Graham factors and any secondary considerations. Therefore, using these tests, you may be able to invalidate a design patent either through an inter-parties review in the USPTO or in a court proceeding.

New Greek law (5103/2024) for the protection and enhancement of Greek music

On 17/04/2024 the Greek Parliament enacted Law No. 5103/2024 dealing with, among other issues, the “protection” and “enhancement” of Greek Music.

The Law introduces a minimum threshold of 40% Greek music (as defined in the Law) that is performed in public in various places such as casinos, malls, etc. It has both been praised as a “gift” to Greek musicians and authors and heavily criticised as eventually anti-constitutional and against EU legislation.

The basic provisions of the Law are as follows:

Definitions

For the purposes of the Law, the following definitions apply:

Article 3

a. A Greek-language song means a musical work composed of music and lyrics, as long as at least half of its duration is occupied by text in the Greek language. The concept of Greek-language songs also includes the orchestral musical performance of a Greek-language song, as well as musical works without lyrics that have been recorded in Greek territory.

b. New phonograms mean the phonograms of a Greek-language song within the meaning of para. a, which incorporate new musical works whose first release or presentation or distribution or upon request distribution to the public took place up to one (1) year before the radio broadcast their transmission.

c. Format means the single list of works within the meaning of par. 1 of article 24 of Law 4481/2017 (A’ 100) that have been publicly executed by the parties under articles 8, 9, 10, and 11 hereof and in which the title and duration of the works, the details of the composers and the details of the lyricists are included as a minimum.

d. The common areas of the accommodations referred to in paragraph 1 of article 8 are understood exclusively as the entrance and reception areas and the elevators.

e. The common areas of the shopping centers of par. 1 of Article 9 means exclusively the parking areas, corridors, and other areas where visitors stay, excluding the commercial stores and other independent businesses that operate within them.

f. The common areas of the casinos referred to in paragraph 1 of article 10 are understood exclusively as the reception and waiting areas for customers.

g. The common areas of the means of public transport referred to in paragraph 1 of article 11 mean exclusively the areas of the stations and the boarding and disembarking platforms of metro and train passengers, the areas of the stations and the boarding and disembarking platforms of the electric railways.

h. The common passenger waiting areas of airports and ports referred to in paragraph 1 of article 11 mean exclusively the covered areas intended for the waiting of passengers before they board planes and ships, respectively.

The purpose of the Law is:

(i) the establishment of incentives to increase the transmission of Greek-language songs and new recordings by radio stations, informative and non-informative,

(ii) the introduction of an obligation to perform a certain percentage of Greek-language songs in specific common areas of hotels and complex tourist accommodations, shopping centers, casinos, and public transport, as well as in the passenger waiting areas of airports and ports,

(iii) the establishment of a potential assessment of audio-visual productions, television or cinematographic, which incorporate a soundtrack of a Greek-language song or an orchestral musical performance of a Greek-language song or musical works without lyrics or with lyrics in the language of a member state of the EU, which are recorded in the territory, according to the rules and eligibility conditions of each aid scheme or financial instrument of the Greek State and

(iv) the creation of an electronic database of Greek-language songs and an online application to access it.

Important provisions of the Law:

Regarding the mandatory use of “Greek-language” music, the Law provides specifically the following. It is noted that there has been a “last minute” change regarding orchestral music, which is now considered to qualify as Greek-language music if the recording of the musical work without lyrics has been made in Greece.

Article 8

It is provided that the minimum percentage of Greek-language music performed in the common areas of hotels and complex tourist accommodations (as such meaning exclusively the entrance, reception areas, and elevators) if public music is performed, cannot be lower than forty percent (40%) of all performed musical works. Also, in par. 2 the deadline and the body for submission of the forms proving compliance with the obligation of par. 1 are determined.

Article 9

It is foreseen that the minimum percentage of performing Greek-language songs in the common areas of the shopping centers (as such meaning exclusively the parking areas, corridors, and other areas where visitors stay, not including the shops and other independent businesses operating within them) if public music is performed, it cannot be lower than forty percent (40%) of the total musical works performed.

Paragraph 2 specifies the deadline and the body for submission of the forms that demonstrate compliance with the obligation of paragraph 1.

Article 10

It is provided that the minimum percentage of Greek-language songs performed in the common areas of casinos (as such understood exclusively in the reception and waiting areas for customers and elevators), cannot be lower than forty percent (40%) of the total musical works performed as long as music is performed in public.

Paragraph 2 specifies the deadline and the body for submission of the forms that demonstrate compliance with the obligation of paragraph 1.

Article 11

It is provided that in the common areas of the means of public transport (as such understood exclusively the areas of the stations and platforms for boarding and disembarking passengers of the metro and trains, the areas of the stations and platforms for boarding and disembarking passengers of the electric railways) and in the passenger’s waiting areas of airports and ports (as such meaning exclusively the covered areas intended for “hosting” passengers before boarding planes and ships respectively), the minimum percentage of transmission of Greek-language music cannot be lower than forty-five percent (45% ) of all performed musical works, as long as public music is broadcasted. In par. 2, the deadline and the body for submitting the forms that prove compliance with the obligation of par. 1 are determined. In par. 3, a reduction of the percentage of par. 1 by 50% is provided if, for technical reasons, the public broadcasting takes place simultaneously in common spaces, which do not fall within the meaning of paragraph e of article 3.

Article 12

It is provided that audio-visual productions, television or cinematographic, regardless of content (fiction, creative documentation or animation), whose soundtrack incorporates more than the percentage defined by the joint ministerial decision of par. 2 of article 30, Greek-language song or orchestral music performance of a Greek-language song or musical works without lyrics or with lyrics in the language of an EU member state, which are recorded in Greek territory in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 4 of article 54 of Commission Regulation (EU) 651/2014, may be evaluated for this reason, according to the eligibility rules and conditions of the respective aid regimes or financial instruments of the Greek State, which operate in accordance with the provisions of the above Regulation (EU).

Article 13

It is created in the Ministry of Culture a) an electronic database of Greek-language songs, orchestral musical performances of Greek-language songs, orchestral music by Greek composers, and sound recordings recorded in the territory and b) an online application connected to the electronic database which is posted on the official website of the Ministry of Culture upon written consent of the beneficiaries. The electronic database contains the identification data of Greek-language songs, orchestral musical performances of Greek-language songs, orchestral music by Greek composers, and recordings recorded in Greek territory based on the data provided by the competent collective management organizations. The online application provides the possibility of searching the content of the electronic database, drawing up an original list of Greek-language songs, orchestral musical performances of Greek-language songs, orchestral music by Greek composers, and sound recordings recorded in the territory after written consent of the beneficiaries and issuance of all the forms required to fulfill the notification obligations of the obliged hotels and complex tourist accommodations and those who have the exploitation of the common areas of the shopping centers, casinos, the means of public transport, the passenger waiting areas of airports and ports.

Article 14

The procedure for control and imposition of administrative sanctions against each category of obligees, for the violation of the obligations of broadcasting a Greek-language song, is defined. Finally, the procedure for the collection of fines, the fines, and the cases in which the Intellectual Property Organization may recommend the non-imposition of a fine are defined.

The Law as such has already created interpretation problems related to its implementation and the specific cases where the obligation to perform/broadcast a minimum percentage of Greek music applies.

There are also serious reactions by foreign rightsholders who are definitely affected adversely by those provisions when at the same time Greek rightsholders and their CMOs are extremely happy with the new Law and push for its immediate implementation in order to increase their market share and revenues from the places which are covered by the obligations imposed by the above Law in relation to the nationality of the music works which are being broadcasted in the places where the Law imposes this obligation for a minimum percentage of “Greek language” music as the latter is defined by the Law itself.

This article was originally edited by, and first published on, www.lexology.com. Please click here to view the original publication.

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